Aave (AAVE)

The engine returns 13/100 LOW on contract security. The AAVE token is a non-upgradeable ERC-20 with fixed maximum supply. Source is verified. No honeypot is detected. No mint authority is active - the ecosystem reserve holds pre-minted tokens; supply cannot be inflated through the token contract. LP is reported UNLOCKED (88.4% of LP tokens unlocked, 0% locked, 0% burned). The on-chain verified DEX liquidity at scan time is $2.57M - institutional depth on centralised exchanges dwarfs the DEX pool, so price is not DEX-pool-dependent. The LP Not Time-Locked condition is factored into the score; it is not flagged as a formal finding because context confirms DAO treasury custody rather than anonymous EOA control.

Protocol governance runs through AaveGovernanceV2. Two executor contracts handle different categories of changes: a Short Executor with a 24-hour timelock for parameter adjustments, and a Long Executor with a longer delay for critical changes such as implementation upgrades. No protocol change can execute immediately. The timelock window is the primary protection for users - it provides a reaction interval between a proposal passing and its effect taking hold. The core Aave V3 lending contracts use TransparentUpgradeableProxy controlled by the governance timelock; the AAVE token contract itself is not upgradeable.

Voting power is concentrated. AAVE holders can delegate to any address, and in practice the top delegate addresses account for a significant share of active voting power. The top holder at scan time holds 14.01% of supply, confirmed as the stkAAVE staking contract (Staked Aave) - a legitimate custody dependency, not a whale accumulator. In total 201,007 holders are recorded. Binance and Robinhood custody addresses (combined 7.85% of supply) are excluded from effective concentration calculations. Governance concentration is an observable on-chain condition, not a hidden threat. It represents an institutional dependency rather than a technical exploit surface.

The Aave Guardian is a multisig with the ability to cancel proposals that have passed a governance vote but not yet executed. It is an emergency veto, not a routine governance actor. Its composition includes partially attributed signers - some addresses correspond to known entities, others are not in the entity registry. The Guardian exists to prevent clearly malicious proposals from executing if governance is temporarily compromised. Governance and control coverage is 2 of 4 dimensions assessed at scan time; upgradeability and vote parameters are partially covered.